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Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Political Expenditures
Prohibition of Taft-Hartley Act-An editorial endorsing a Congres-
sional candidate was published by the defendant CIO in its regularly-cir-
culated newspaper, with the intention of expressly violating for test pur-
poses § 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act.' One thousand extra copies were
distributed free in the election district. In quashing the indictment against
the CIO and its president, Murray, the court held that § 304 was an un-
constitutional abridgement of freedom of speech and of the press insofar
as it prohibited expenditures by labor organizations in connection with
federal elections. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,
3 CCH LAB. LAW SERV. f 64,384 (D. D. C. 1948), probable jurisdiction
noted, 16 U. S. L. WEEK 3294 (U. S. March 30, 1948).
In extending the scope of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 2 to
prohibit political "expenditures" as well as "contributions" by corpora-
tions and labor unions, Congress clearly intended to forbid expressions
of editorial opinion aimed at influencing the electorate, so long as the
medium was supported by union dues or corporate funds, as distinguished
from a publication which "sold for its worth." 3 It was this broad con-
struction that the court applied in striking down the statute, despite the
fact that free distribution of additional copies.might have justified a nar-
rower interpretation.4 If it is possible to distinguish what may be termed
pamphleteering 5 from the publication of a newspaper, a decision that the
former may be constitutionally prohibited would not necessarily involve
consideration of the broader issue. The distinction would hinge upon the
assumption that there is no constitutional obstacle to a statute which makes
corporate or union political contributions unlawful.
0
Implicit in the terms of § 304 is the thesis that political activity is
not properly the function of a labor organization, a position which lacks
candor so long as legislation-a political product-shapes the pattern of
labor activity. The avowed intention of Congress to protect union minor-
ities against the use of their dues payments for political causes to which
they may be opposed 7 grates harshly upon democratic reverence for
1. 61 STAT. 159, 29 U. S. C. A. § 251 (Supp. 1947).
2. 43 STAT. 1074 (1925), 2 U. S. C. §251 (1940), as amended, 57 STAT. 167
(1943), 50 U. S. C. App. § 1509 (Supp. 1947).
3. 93 Cong. Rec. 6593-6595 (June 5, 1947).
4. A court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. Alabama State Fed. of Labor v.
McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 461 (1944) and cases there cited.
5. 93 CONG. REc. 6594, 6595 (June 5, 1947) ; SEN. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 57-59 (1944).
6. Although political contributions by corporations have been unlawful since 1907,
34 STAT. 863 (1907), as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 251 (1940), the constitutionality of
the provision has been challenged only once, and that in a district court. United
States v. Brewers' Ass'n, 239 Fed. 163 (D. C. Pa. 1916). A similar provision, how-
ever, in the Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U. S. C.
§ 791(h) (1940), was upheld in Egan v. United States, 137 F. 2d 369 (C. C. A. 8th
1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 788 (1943). Such paucity of litigation might indicate
either unquestioned acceptance of the provision's constitutionality or attest to the
ease with which it could be circumvented One technique for circumvention which
suggests itself is the use of contributions by individual officers and shareholders,
rather than by the corporation.
7. 93 CONG. REc. 6598 (June 5, 1947).
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majority rule as well as upon other provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act it-
self," which vest in majority-chosen representatives functions far more
personal and important to the workman than the use of union funds for
political purposes. If these are the evils which § 304 sought to remedy,
evils which constitute no clear and present danger to free and unfettered
elections, then there can be no justification for the slightest abridgement"
of the rights protected by the First Amendment."0 The sweeping language
of that constitutional command 1 makes irrelevant an inquiry as to whether
or not a union is such a "citizen" or "person" as can lay claim to its
protection; those considerations are not so material as they would be if
the Fourteenth Amendment 12 were involved. Moreover, a broad con-
struction of § 304 would go beyond mere abridgement to eliminate entirely
all expression of labor's political viewpoint. Unless the right of free
speech can be conceived as existing in a vacuum, there must be a cor-
relative right of communication, 13 which to be effective necessarily in-
volves expenditures. The blanketing effect of the statute upon free speech,
and the fact that every union activity, to some degree at least, involves an
expenditure, sufficiently justify bold treatment of the provision's broadest
possible application, 14 leading to the result reached here by the District
Court. By no means does it follow that the door has been shut to legis-
lative regulation of campaign expenditures. If we keep in mind that the
prohibition against contributions has been noted more for its circuitous
breach than for its observance, 15 and that a provision forbidding expendi-
tures is certain to meet a similar fate, there is logic and seasoned
political judgment'" supporting the principle that elections can best be
guarded against corruptive influences by legislation which would establish
means for giving the widest publicity to all political expenditures, no
matter what the source.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-State Criminal Statute Ban-
ning Publications Exploiting Accounts of Violent Crime Void for
Indefiniteness-A New York bookseller, convicted under a statute
making it a misdemeanor to deal in printed matter "devoted to the publica-
tion . . . of criminal news, . . . or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust, or
8. Sec. 1 provides for the designation by workers of "representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment
or other mutual aid or protection." Sec. 9(a) provides for the designation of ex-
clusive collective bargaining representatives "by the majority of the employees."
(Emphasis added.)
9. Some abridgment by § 304 of the rights protected by the First Amendment is
apparently conceded by the Government. See Brief for Government, pp. 38-40.
10. ". . . any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger."
Rutledge, J., in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1944).
11. U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. I: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .. ."
12. U. S. CONsT. AMEND. XIV § 1: "... No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens . . ." (emphasis
added).
13. NLRB v. Ford, 114 F. 2d 905, 913 (C. C. A. 6th 1940), cert. denied, 312
U. S. 689.
14. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 535 (1944).
15. Supra, note 5. See also SEN. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Tabulation
of contributions by prominent family groups 140 (1944).
16. Id. at 6-7, 80-84.
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crime . ," 1 appealed, alleging that the statute violates free expression
and that by indefiniteness it denies due process. In upholding the con-
viction 2 the New York Court of Appeals construed the statute as appli-
cable only to materials "so massed as to become vehicles for inciting
violent and depraved crimes against the person." 3 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court, after three arguments, reversed (three justices
dissenting), because the statute is so indefinite as to be applicable to in-
nocent acts and render it impossible for the individual to know what con-
stitutes violation, and thus violates the due process clause. Winters v.
People, 68 Sup. Ct. 665 (1948).
In drafting a penal statute the need for a standard of illegality in-
telligible to the public must be balanced against the need for generality
of wording sufficient to prevent easy evasion.4 What balance will afford
due process is difficult to ascertain from Supreme Court decisions; the
criteria they afford are themselves indefinite. 5 The standard is usually
phrased as a requirement that the statute give notice of what is prohibited
to those of ordinary intelligence affected by it.' An alternative test,
equivalent in significance and effect, is whether the statute leaves overly
wide discretion to court and jury.7 The common law definitions of offenses
have, in effect, been exempted from the requirement of definiteness by the
theory that judicial interpretation has cured their vagueness.8  That it
has not made them intelligible to the layman is clear.9 The standards
noted above are applied where, as here, the statute creates a new offense.
A synthesis of decisions reveals scant basis for predicting what language
will be satisfactory. "Unreasonable restraint of trade" is definite, 10 while
"unreasonable rate or charge" is indefinite,"' but "reasonable allowance
for salaries" is sufficiently informative.' 2 While the Court has approved
a statute requiring people to judge correctly a matter of degree to de-
termine the limits of criminality,' 3 it has disapproved where the basis for
judgment is too conjectural.' 4 Broadly general terms have been found
1. NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 1141(2).
2. People v. Winters, 294 N. Y. 545, 63 N. E. 2d 98 (1945).
3. Id. at 550, 63 N. E. 2d at 100. "This construction fixes the meaning of the
statute for this case." Winters v. People, 68 Sup. Ct. 665, 669 (1948), citing Hebert
v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 317 (1926) ; Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69, 79 (1941).
This was despite the absence of any language in the opinion of the New York court
indicating an intent to construe the statute or limit its applicability by the words
quoted.
4. See Winters v. People, 68 Sup. Ct. 665, 675 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
5. Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 160 (1931).
6. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926); Whitney v.
California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) ; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1947).
7. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921) ; see Waters-Pierce
Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U. S. 86, 109 (1909).
8. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 242
(1932) ; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926) ; Note, 45
HARV. L. Rxv. 160 (1931).
9. Note, 45 HARV. L. R.v. 160 (1931).
10. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913).
11. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921).
12. United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513 (1941).
13. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913); United States v. Wurzbach,
280 U. S. 396 (1930).
14. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216 (1914).
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sufficient,15 detailed language indefinite. 16 No trends or factors common
to decisions either way are discoverable. The standard obviously varies
considerably with the area of conduct regulated.
The statute involved here, as enacted, was worded so as to be ap-
plicable to much literature that could not have offended the legislature,
and it is clearly void for indefiniteness.17 As interpreted it merely sets forth
the psychological judgment that gave rise to the legislature's action, leav-
ing to the public and the court and jury the scientific evaluation neces-
sary in every instance of possible violation, an evaluation which they can
not be properly called on to make without more definite guidance. The
Court judged this to be the basic failing of the statute. In addition, the
fact that the statute limits free speech with questionable justification 18 was
doubtless persuasive.
The theory that literature can incite to crime may be sufficiently
established to warrant the legislature's exercise of the police power.'9
However, there are so many variable elements, many not part of the book,
that determine whether a particular book will incite to crime, that it ap-
pears impossible to embody in one statute an accurate scientific appraisal
of what publications present the danger and under what conditions they
do so. Though the Supreme Court will not carry the requirement of
definiteness so far as to render impossible the formulation of needed
statutes,20 the obstacles confronting efforts to devise a workable and
definite statute in this field indicate that the legislature might better strike
deeper at the roots of crime rather than attempt to suppress this one
among many superficial aggravating influences.
Constitutional Law-Repeal of Legislative Pardon Held Not
Ex Post Facto Although Affecting a Prior Conviction-When the
relator, an alien named Forino, was convicted of second degree murder
in Pennsylvania, a state statute provided that endurance of his punish-
ment would operate as a pardon.' On the authority of a previous de-
cision,2 this would have exempted him from deportation, which otherwise
15. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343 (1918) (priority of possessory right
between cattle and sheep owners to any "range" determined by the priority in the"usual and customary use" of it as a cattle or sheep range) ; Nash v. United States,
229 U. S. 373 (1913) ("unreasonable restraint").
16. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939) (law making it an offense to
be a "gangster" defined "gangster" as "any person not engaged in any lawful occupa-
tion, known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has
been convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has been
convicted of any crime, in this or in any other State . . ."); Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926) (law prohibiting payment of wages less than
the "current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed").
17. See Winters v. People, 68 Sup. Ct. 665, 668 (1948).
18. The free speech issue attracted briefs from the American Civil Liberties
Union and the Authors' League of America, Inc. as amici curiae. A decision of the
question was rendered unnecessary by the finding of indefiniteness. The dissent
determines that the constitutional right is not infringed, but the question remains
highly controversial.
19. Although this conclusion is rendered questionable by the apparent "dead-
letter" nature of this statute. See Winters v. People, 68 Sup. Ct" 665, 668 (1948).
But see Winters v. People, supra at 673, n. 2 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
20. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1947) ; see Winters v. People, 68 Sup.
Ct 665, 672 (1948).
1. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 19, § 893 (Purdon, 1941).
2. Perkins v. United States, 99 F. 2d 255 (C. C. A. 3d 1938).
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would follow conviction under § 19 of the immigration Act.3  While he
was in prison, however, the state statute was repealed, 4 and immigration
authorities arrested him. Suing out a writ of habeas corpus, Forino con-
tended that the repeal was ex post facto and void, as applied to him, under
state and federal constitutions.5 Rejecting this argument, the Circuit
Court denied the writ. United States ex rel. Forina v. Garfinkel, 166
F. 2d 887 (C. C. A. 3d 1948).
A law which increases the punishment for a crime after it has been
committed is ex post facto.6 In the instant case, the court reasoned that
since a pardon is an "act of grace," withdrawal of access theretb by the
body which originally conferred it, did not increase punishment. Such a
description of pardon seems to require this conclusion. However, "act of
grace" is properly applicable to pardons bestowed at the discretion of
the executive, 7 from which this legislative pardon is validly distinguish-
able on the ground that it would have followed, indiscriminately
and automatically, on the passage of time.8 It is at least arguable that,
before repeal, it set a definite limit on the consequences to flow from
the commission of a crime, in that a pardon effects a restoration to the
criminal of such civil rights as are lost by conviction.9 If we accept this
distinction, then if the loss of civil rights, such as the right to practice a
profession, can be considered punishment within the ex post facto clause,
the repeal of the legislative pardon did increase Forino's punishment. De-
cisions dealing with the clause are inconsistent as to whether civil dis-
abilities consequent on a crime are to be termed punishment.' ° Generally,
if courts have felt it relevant to the protection of society that individuals be
deprived of certain civil rights for certain offenses, they have held that
such deprivation was not punishment; if irrelevant, punishment, and ex
post facto if retroactive." The first position, although reaching a desir-
able result, delimits somewhat illogically the definition of punishment.
3. 39 STAT. 889 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 155 (1940). This section expressly exempts
pardoned criminals.
4. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 5201 (Purdon, 1941).
5. U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 10; PA. CONST. Art I, § 17.
6. This appeared as dictum in an early Supreme Court decision. See Calder v.
Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (U. S. 1798). It has been exclusively followed. Common-
wealth v. Smith, 345 Pa. 512, 29 A. 2d 912 (1942) ; Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S.
397 (1937).
7. Cases used by the Circuit Court as authority for the term "act of grace"
relate entirely to executive pardons. United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 (U. S.
1833); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 44 Pa. 210 (1863); Commonwealth v. Ahl, 43
Pa. 53 (1863).
8. The pardon accrued unconditionally upon completion of punishment for all
crimes except first degree murder and perjury. See note 1 supra.
9. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866); Commonwealth v. Quaranta,
295 Pa. 264, 145 AtI. 89 (1928). The legislative pardon had the same effect. Perkins
v. United States, 99 F. 2d 255 (C. C. A. 3d 1938). Historical Note, 19 Purdon § 893
indicates that the legislative intention was the automatic restoration of civil rights
to reformed convicts (in part, at least, to reestablish them as competent witnesses).
For a consideration of civil disabilities and pardon, see Weihofen, The Effect of a
Pardon, 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 177 (1939)-.
10. Typically inconsistent are: Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898)
(civil disability held not punishment) ; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 320-22
(U. S. 1866) (civil disability held punishment).
11. Cases in accord with Hawker v. New York, supra note 10, adopt the theory
that relevant disabilities are qualifications requisite to the enjoyment of certain civil
rights, rather than added punishment (e. g., public protection may require that felons
be retroactively disqualified from practicing law). A greater proportion of these
decisions are relatively recent, perhaps a recognition of the necessity for public
control of admission to many occupations. Cases v. United States, 131 F. 2d 916
(C. C. A. 1st 1942).
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Civil disabilities serve, as does punishment, to incapacitate. Indeed, if
irrelevant to protection, such disabilities are punishment only in the re-
tributive sense. One purpose of the ex post facto clause is to prevent
retroactive criminal legislation formulated to serve personal or political
ends.' 2  This is fully accomplished only if it includes in its prohibitions
the imposition of punishment in the form of civil disabilities.
13
To preclude all possibility of such arbitrary governmental action, the
clause has been interpreted as absolute; the test of unconstitutionality is
not unreasonableness, but mere retroactivity. 14 As a result it may invali-
date necessary alterations in the criminal law which do not in fact injure
any interest that the Constitution was designed to safeguard. 15 Judicial
efforts to avoid this have occasioned such inconsistencies as noted above,
and, perhaps, also prompted the decision in the instant case. Such de-
cisions seem to indicate that the pressures which originally demanded an
unequivocal definition of ex post facto law have yielded in some measure
to the need for reasonable retroactivity in the exercise of the police power.
Damages-Measure of Damages in Survival Actions in Pennsyl-
vania-A child aged two years and nine months died almost instantly
when struck by defendant's streetcar. In the action brought by his ad-
ministrator,' the court charged, as to the count under the Survival Act,
that if the jury found for plaintiff, recovery for loss of earnings should
equal the present value of deceased's probable gross earnings 2 from age
twenty-one through his life expectancy. On appeal, held that the proper
measure of damages in a survival action is the deceased infant's probable
12. See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 389 (U. S. 1798).
13. There seems little doubt that civil disabilities constitute punishment when
prospectively imposed. 4 BL. CoMM. *377; HENTIG, PUNISHMENT 230 (1937).
14. See McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of the United
States, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 269, 276-77 (1927) ; Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397
(1937).
15. Regardless of the need or the purpose behind the change, even slight increases
in punishment are void. Extraordinary frustrations of the criminal law have re-
sulted. E. g., Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95 (1860) (convicted murderess released
because the new penal statute, having repealed the old, made an insignificant change
in punishment).
1. Pennsylvania statutes provide for three kinds of actions where the death of
the injured person is involved. If the action has been commenced during deceased's
lifetime, his personal representative may be substituted to prosecute the action after
the death. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 771 (Purdon, 1931). If the injured person dies
without having brought an action, his personal representative may bring a "survival"
action in his stead. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 772 (Purdon, Supp. 1947). In addi-
tion to an action under § 772 for the benefit of deceased's estate, the personal repre-
sentative may bring a "wrongful death" action for the benefit of surviving spouse,
parents, or children. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 1601 (Purdon, 1931), § 1602 (Purdon,
Supp. 1947); PA. R. Civ. P., 2202. See also, Note, Damages for Wrongful Death in
Pennsylvania, 91 U. OF PA. L. REv. 68 (1942).
2. Gross earnings are those ". . . which deceased would have made . . .
without deduction for any expenses whatsoever." Net earnings are ". . . what the
deceased would have earned, less what it would have cost him to live." (emphasis
added). McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 96 (1935). Pezzulli
v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A. 2d b59 (1942), involved a third possible measure
of damages, accumulations, defined by McCormick, ibid., as ". . . the amount that the
deceased by his own efforts would probably have saved and retained during the
period of life of which he has been deprived."
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net earnings from age twenty-one projected over his life expectancy, re-
duced to present value 3 (one justice dissenting 4). Murray v. Philadel-
phia Transportation Co., 359 Pa. 69 (1948).
In Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia,5 the only similar case arising under the
Survival Act previously considered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
a verdict based on net earnings was allowed to stand because plaintiff had
not objected to a charge directing the jury to compute damages on that
basis, but th court clearly indicated that it would otherwise have adopted
the gross earnings rule.6 In the instant case, the court refused to follow
this dictum; instead, it adopted the net earnings rule,7 and although the
issue was not before it, intimated that it would likewise apply that rule
where the personal representative was merely substituted for the de-
ceased,8 a course which would overturn the precedents of nearly a cen-
tury.9
If we accept as a premise the orthodox view that the function of tort
law with respect to negligently-caused injuries is to compensate for eco-
nomic loss therefrom but not to punish, the gross earnings rule can be sup-
ported only by highly conceptual reasoning. It is said that a totally dis-
abled plaintiff may recover his gross earnings; the administrator's sur-
vival action is the same action that the injured person might have brought;
therefore, the administrator's recovery should be'based on the same
measure of damages as would have been applied had the injured person
survived. The argument ignores the fact that damages computed on the
gross earnings basis include sums which deceased would necessarily have
expended for his personal maintenance and which therefore could not
have become part of his estate. It may plausibly be argued, however, that
man is more than a mere money-making machine, and that accordingly
damages for the destruction of human life should not be confined to
economic loss. This principle has been recognized since 1937 in England,
where "loss of expectation of life" is a proper element of damages re-
3. Pennsylvania, by thus permitting the inclusion of loss of prospective earnings
as an element of damages in a survival action, is an exception to the general rule as
stated by McCoRmIcK, op cit. supra note 2, § 94: where recovery may be had under
both a Survival and a Death Act, ". . . the damages recovered under the Survival
Act are . . . the loss of earnings, the expenses of medical care, and the pain and
suffering sustained by the injured person while he lived." (emphasis added). The
general rule, under which lost earnings would not be recoverable in case of in-
stantaneous death, was followed in earlier decisions of lower Pennsylvania courts:
see, e. g., Glaesser v. Evans, 36 Pa. D. & C. 68 (1939) ; Gannon v. Lawler, 34 Pa.
D. & C. 571 (1939).
4. Stern, J.
5. See note 2, supra.
6. Id. at 648, 26 A. 2d at 661-662.
7. If this rule is conscientiously applied by juries, damages awarded may con-
ceivably shrink to the vanishing point, as in Voelkel v. Bennett, 115 F. 2d 102 (C. C.
A. 3d 1940). In that case, a federal court was called upon to lay down the measure
of damages in a survival action under § 772 (supra note 1) before the state's court of
last resort had construed that section. A charge in terms of the net earnings rule
resulted in the jury finding against defendant but awarding no damages.
8. "But if such a plaintiff dies, and his action is brought to trial by his adminis-
trator, . . . [the latter] should receive only the loss of earning power less cost of
maintenance." Instant case at 73. The court did not, however, make clear how late
in the proceedings the injured party's death will change the measure of damages;
whether the net earnings rule will be applied where the injured plaintiff dies while
the action is being tried, or after trial but before final judgment on appeal is entered,
are still unanswered questions.
9. Dissenting opinion, instant case at 76, citing authorities.
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coverable for the benefit of deceased's estate. 10 The customary allowance
by American courts of recovery for deceased's pain and suffering may re-
flect something of the same feeling, since rationally the right to recover
for injuries of such a highly personal nature should perish with the victim,
as is the case in defamation and seduction actions."' Perhaps the dissenting
opinion's advocacy of the gross earnings rule springs from a similar urge to
permit an extra-economic recovery; if so, it might have been preferable
to articulate it so as to focus attention on this element of damages and
thus pave the way for its possible acceptance by American jurisdictions.
Admittedly the increment representing deceased's probable personal main-
tenance expenditures is an imperfect measure of the non-commercial value
of his life, yet it bears some relation to his prospect of a happy life had
death not supervened, and offers the only relatively certain yardstick' 2
thus far suggested.
Evidence-Blood Grouping Tests-Use and Weight as Evidence
of Non-Paternity-In a bastardy action, complainant introduced evi-
dence that she and defendant had sexual intercourse on a certain date
and that a child was born within the normal period of gestation there-
after. Defendant neither denied her story nor attempted to show that
any one other than himself could have been responsible for her preg-
nancy, but relied solely on the results of blood grouping tests made of
himself, the complainant and the child. These tests proved, from a
medical standpoint, that the defendant could not possibly be the father of
the child. The jury, relying on complairiant's testimony rather than the
scientific evidence, rendered a verdict for the complainant. A motion for
a new trial, on defendant's contention that the results of the blood group-
ing tests should be conclusive, was denied. Jordan v. Davis, 57 A. 2d 209
(Me. 1948).
The basis for determining non-paternity by blood grouping tests was
the discovery that readily distinguishable qualities of the blood 1 are in-
herited in accordance with definite laws.2  These laws reveal that certain
10. As stated in Benham v. Gambling, [1941] A. C. 157 (1940) at 166-167, this
item of damages is intended to compensate ". . . for loss of a measure of prospective
happiness . . .", not for ". . . loss of future pecuniary prospects." No clear guide
to determination of the award has yet been enunciated, and because of the arbitrary
assessments of damages bearing little relation to deceased's age or station in life
which have resulted the "loss of expectation of life" basis has aroused considerable
adverse criticism. Compare Loss of Expectation of Life, 91 L. J. 34-35, 46-47 (1941)
(reviewing decisions and proposing abolition of this basis) with Goodhart, Damages
for Loss of Life Under America, Law, 82 L. J. 293-294, 311-312 (1936) (favorable
comment).
11. See, e. g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, §771 (Purdon, 1931), §772 (Purdon,
Supp. 1947) (actions for slander or libel may not be revived or continued by per-
sonal representative); Law Reform (Misc. Provisions) Act, 24 & 25 Geo. V, c. 41,
§ 1(1) C'. . . causes of action for defamation, seduction or inducing one spouse to
leave or remain apart from the other . . ." do not survive).
12. As compared with the English rule, expressed in Benham v. Gambling,
=pra note 10.
1. These are serological differences in human blood designated as groups A, B,
AB and 0 and types M, N, and MN. For a scientific analysis of these properties,
see WEINER, BLOOD GROUPS AND TRANsFusioNs cc. II, XIII (3d ed. 1946); 1 Wia-
MORE, EVIDENCE §§ 165a, 165b (3d ed. 1940) ; Hooker and Boyd, Blood Grouping as
a Test for Non-Paternity, 25 3. CRI.s. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187 (1934).
2. WEINER, op cit. supra, note 1, cc. XI, XIV; writings cited in note 1, and
Galton, Blood Grouping Tests and Their Relationship to tife Law, 17 ORE. L. REv.
177 (1938).
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combinations of blood characteristics in the parents can produce only
certain combinations in the child.3 Conversely, if the bloods of the mother
and child are known, there are certain groups to which the blood of the
father cannot belong. It is to be noted that the test cannot prove pater-
nity; it is a test of exclusion only.
Although the European courts admitted the results of blood grouping
tests as evidence in filiation proceedings almost simultaneously with their
acceptance by the medical profession,4 the United States tribunals were
slower to recognize their evidentiary value.5 The first reported recogni-
tion was by an inferior Pennsylvania court which granted full value to
the blood grouping test.6 Thereafter, a struggle developed around a
court's power to compel recalcitrant individuals to submit to the tests.
For varied reasons, many courts felt that they did not have such power.7
Other courts found no difficulty in granting defendant's request for an
order that a blood test be made.8 A minority of courts further vexed
the problem by holding it error to admit as evidence the results of blood
grouping tests.9 Several enlightened legislatures have resolved both prob-
lems by enacting statutes granting courts the power to compel parties to
filiation proceedings to submit to blood grouping tests and directing that
the results of such tests shall be admissible as evidence where exclusion
is established.' 0
Courts, however, which admit the results of blood grouping tests
have doggedly refused to give them more weight than other types of evi-
dence.:" In the light of the empirical knowledge medical science has ob-
3. See WEINER, op. cit. supra, note 1, c. XXI for a simple and graphic descrip-
tion of the operation of these laws.
4. Medical confirmation of the principles involved was unreservedly granted by
1924 or 1925. Maguire, A Survey of Blood Group Dectsions and Legislation in. the
American Law of Evidence, 16 So. CALIF. L. REV. 161, 164 (1934). The test was
first used as evidence in Germany in 1924. Schoch, Determination of Paternity by
Blood-Grouping Tests: The European Experience, 16 So. CALIF. L. REV. 177, 178
(1943).
5. The reluctance of the judiciary to accept established medical facts as a facet
of the "cultural lag" problem is pointedly analyzed in Britt, Blood-Grouping Tests
and the Law: The Problem of "Cultural Lag," 21 MINN. L. REv. 671 (1937), and
Britt, Blood-Grouping Tests and More "Cultural Lag," 22 MINN. L. REv. 836
(1938). The law's tardiness occurs more in according adequate weight to scientific
evidence than in the admission of such evidence. Courts have admitted as evidence
ballistics reports, fingerprints, X-rays, sound motion pictures, phonograph records and
dictaphone discs. Comment, 4 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 199, 200 (1947).
6. Commonwealth v. Zammarelli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229 (1931) (evidence of a
blood grouping test having been introduced and a contrary verdict returned, a new
trial was granted because the verdict was against the evidence).
7. Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N. J. 633, 16 A. 2d 80 (Ch. 1940) (the order would
violate the privilege against self-incrimination and right to personal privacy). Contra:
Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 444, 45 A. 2d 85, 88 (1945).
8. State v. Welling, 6 Ohio Opins. 371, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 448 (1936); Beuschel
v. Manowitz, 151 Misc. 899, 271 N. Y. Supp. 277 (King's Cty. 1934), rev'd, 241 App.
Div. 888, 272 N. Y. Supp. 165 (2d Dep't 1934).
9. Commonwealth v. Krutsick, 151 Pa. Super. 164, 32 A. 2d 325 (1943);
Ketcham's Appeal, 254 App. Div. 776, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 786 (2d Dep't 1938).
10. ME. REv. STAT., c. 153, § 34 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 12, § 17 (Cum.
Supp. 1947); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2:99-3,-4 (Supp. 1947); N. Y. Dom. RELATIONS
COURT AcT, tit. 1, art. 2, § 34 (1942) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 49-7 (Supp. 1945); OHIO
GEN. CODE ANN. § 12122-1,-2 (Supp. 1947) ; S. D. CODE § 36.0602 (1939); Wis.
Stat. §§ 166.105 & 325-23 (1943). A federal court has found the authority under
Rule 35(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Beach v. Beach, 114 F. 2d 479 (App.
D. C. 1940).
11. Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. 2d 652, 169 P. 2d 442 (1946) ; Arais v. Kalensnikoff,
10 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P. 2d 1043 (1937).
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tained in support of the principles here involved, 12 there seems to be little
justification for this attitude.1 3  As in the instant case, the right of the
jury to determine that there had been faulty laboratory technique which
would invalidate the test may be given as the reason for failing to accord
the test full value. But if there are any doubts on such grounds, the
proper course is to order a new test made. Nor can it be denied that the
relationship of the courts to the community occasionally requires them
to go logically wrong and they might possibly be justified in refusing
to transfer the determination of such important issues as legitimacy or the
right of inheritance from the courtroom to the laboratory.14  With ad-
vancing education, however, the pressures compelling substitution of senti-
ment for reason in the administration of justice should have practically
disappeared. Several courts have shown encouraging tendencies toward
future reform '5 but the judicial process corrects slowly. Members of the
medical and legal professions should bring pressure to bear upon legis-
latures to provide not only that parties to filiation proceedings submit to
blood grouping tests but also that negation of paternity by such a test
shall be a complete defense. Only then will the creation of fathers by
operation of law be checked.
Federal Jurisdiction-Appointment of an Out-of-State Adminis-
tratrix to Gain Diversity Jurisdiction-A citizen of New Jersey was
appointed administratrix of an estate for the sole purpose of obtaining
federal jurisdiction through diversity of citizenship for a tort claim to
be brought under wrongful death and survival statutes. The decedent and
the beneficiaries of the estate were citizens of Pennsylvania, and the de-
fendant was a Pennsylvania corporation. By state law an administratrix
is a real party in interest for procedural purposes' so that her citizenship
would be the criterion for federal jurisdiction based on diversity. There
was a motion to dismiss on the ground that the administratrix was im-
properly and collusively made party plaintiff to gain federal jurisdiction.
The motion was denied. Jaffe, Administratrix v. Philadelphia and
Western Ry., 68 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 219 (E. D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1948).
The federal statute requiring District Courts to dismiss suits where
the parties "have been improperly or collusively made" to create federal
jurisdiction,2 has been applied frequently against "collusion" on the part
12. For data on the results of studies made in this field see WEINER, Op. cit. supra
note 1 at 176, 232 et seq. and 108 A. M. A. J. 2138 (1937).
13. An example of how the courts have strained in seeking justification for
refusing to hold the test conclusive 'is seen in an Ohio case where it is said, inter
alia, "It may brand many honest women, who have committed one indiscretion, with
promiscuity and as liars." State v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16, 20, 24 N. E. 2d 962,
963 (1939).
14. In Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N. J. 633, 16 A. 2d 80 (Ch. 1940) the court
disregarded a blood test statute apparently to avoid stamping an innocent child with
illegitimacy.
15. Schulze v. Schulze, 35 N, Y. S. 2d 218 (1942) (blood test is sufficient to
overcome strong presumption of legitimacy of child born in wedlock). A federal
court while deciding that the parties could be compelled to submit to blood tests
under the authority of federal rules of procedure has expressed a favorable attitude.
Beach v. Beach, 114 F. 2d 479, 480 (App. D. C. 1940).
1. PA. R. Civ. P., 2202. By federal rules an administrator is on a par with real
parties in interest. FED. R. Civ. P., 17(a).
2. 36 STAT. 1098 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §80 (1940).
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of those on only one side of the controversy. 3 The refusal to apply the
statute in the instant case is based chiefly on language used in the Su-
preme Court case of Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.4 to the effect
that the creation of a party to the suit by the act of a state court in grant-
ing letters of administration bars inquiry into the purposes and motives
of those obtaining the appointment. The Mecom case, however, is dis-
tinguishable in that the parties were there trying to avoid rather than
gain federal jurisdiction.5 The distinction is important because the statute
against gaining federal diversity jurisdiction by collusion is part of a
Congressional policy to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts.0 There
seems to be no federal policy against avoiding such jurisdiction.7 Thus,
although the Mecom case has been cited by two federal courts as authority
for allowing parties to gain jurisdiction by such appointment, s it is pos-
sible that these cases gave too broad an interpretation to that Supreme
Court decision. An earlier decision where a district court refused to take
jurisdiction under facts similar to those of the principal case 9 was urged
as persuasive authority for dismissal.
Although it is probable that no injustice was done by allowing the
parties to proceed to trial in the federal court, a stricter application of
limitations on federal jurisdiction would be more in accord with the policy
behind the statutes and the trend towards further limitation of federal
diversity jurisdiction.' 0 Viewed in this light the artificial distinction made
by the court between ordinary collusion, which would presumably lead
to dismissal, and collusion wherein a state court has played a minor and
unknowing role, has little in its favor.
Labor Law-Refusal to Bargain-Inappropriateness of Previ-
ously Certified Bargaining Unit as a Defense in Complaint Proceed-
ing Before the National Labor Relations Board-Workers of the
men's and boys' alteration shop of a retail department store organized as
a unit of a CIO local and were certified by the National Labor Relations
3. Gilbert v. David, 235 U. S. 561 (1915); Southern Realty Inv. Co. v. Walker,
211 U. S. 603 (1909) ; Detroit v. Dean, 106 U. S. 537 (1882).
4. 284 U. S. 183 (1931), 45 HARy. L. Rav. 743 (1932).
5. See 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 2011, 2017 (1938).
6. 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1940) (setting jurisdictional amount
and limiting jurisdiction where an assignment is involved); 43 STAT. 941 (1923), 28
U. S. C. § 42 (1940) (limiting jurisdiction based on federal incorporation); DoBiE,
FEDERAL PROCEDURE 25 (1928).
7. See Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U. S. 43, 45 (1886), and Provident Savings Life
Assurance Society of New York v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635, 641 (1885) where it is
implied that federal courts do not take notice of "collusive" avoidance of federal
jurisdiction.
8. Harrison v. Love, 81 F. 2d 115 (C. C. A. 6th 1936); Stewart v. Patton, 32
F. Supp. 675 (W. D. Tenn. 1940). But cf. Thames v. Mississippi, 117 F. 2d 949
(C. C. A. 5th 1941). In this case state law provided that an administrator is not a
necessary or "real" party, and so the court dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In the
principal case and in all other cases cited in this note applicable state statutes provided
that an administrator is the proper party to bring suit.
9. Cerri v. Akron-People's Telephone Co., 219 Fed. 285 (N. D. Ohio 1914).
10. See legislation listed supra note 6. There is a bill (H. R. 4168) now pending
before Congress to do away with federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.
For a collection of opinions on this bill expressed by various members of the bar see
Shall Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction Be Abolished or Modified?, 30 3.
Ams. JUD. Soc'y 169 (1947). See also Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of
Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 869 (1931), and Frankfurter, A Note
on Diversity Jurisdiction in Reply to Professor Yntenta, 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1097
(1931).
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Board in October 1945.1 The employees of this unit later voted to dis-
affiliate with the CIO and to affiliate with the AFL and were certified by
the Board in August 1946.2 After each certification, employer admittedly
refused to bargain. In November 1946, unfair labor practice charges
based on such refusal were filed by the AFL union and the Board issued
its complaint against the employer. In the complaint proceedings em-
ployer set up as a defense the inappropriateness of the unit,3 but raised
no issue that had not been considered in the representation proceedings.
In dismissing the complaint and reversing the Trial Examiner, the Board
held that the unit previously found appropriate was "an unduly artificial
and impractical grouping" because it excluded employees' doing similar
work in other sections of the store and in the women's alteration shop
with which there was considerable interchange of personnel and mer-
chandise; and that the inappropriateness of the unit absolved the employer
from his duty to bargain under the National Labor Relations Act. 4 Car-
son Pirie Scott & Co., 76 N. L. R. B. No. 148 (Feb. 5, 1948).
Certification of a bargaining unit by the Board is not directly re-
viewable by the courts,5 and is subject to an employer's challenge only
when a complaint of unfair labor practices is predicated on such ruling.
In addition, the courts have held that such determination is binding on
them if the Board has exercised reasonable discretion 0 and if the finding
is consonant with the policy of promoting efficient collective bargaining.1
These well-rooted principles along with the general policy of the Board
itself to refuse to permit attacks on the appropriateness of the unit in a
complaint proceeding 8 have afforded some measure of stability to the
Board's decisions. It is true that the instant case exemplifies the lessen-
ing degree of importance accorded to the extent-of-organization doctrine
as a criterion for determining the appropriate bargaining unit. 9 Yet it
1. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 63 N. L. R. B. 1096 (1945). Before an employer
is required to bargain with a unit it must be certified as appropriate by the Board.
2. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 69 N. L. R. B. 935 (1946). At the time of this
proceeding a refusal to bargain charge filed by the CIO union was pending.
3. Employer contended that only a store wide unit would constitute an appro-
priate bargaining unit, and that the "very smallest unit which has any color of
propriety would be a unit of all employees in the store possessing similar skills and
doing similar work."
4. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1940), as amended, 61 STAT. 136
(1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 141 (Supp. 1947).
5. American Federation of Labor v. N. L. R. B., 308 U. S. 401 (1940). It has
been so held because a certification is not a "final order" of the Board necessary to
obtain judicial review under the Wagner Act, § 10(f), 49 STAT. 449, 455 (1935), and
by the Taft-Hartley Act, § 10(f), 61 STAT. 136, 146 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(f)
(Supp. 1947).
6. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 162 F. 2d 435 (C. C. A. 7th 1947).
7. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B., 313 U. S. 146 (1940).
8. 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 34 (1947).
9. This doctrine considers the extent to which employees are organized at the
particular time into a distinct, homogeneous and identifiable unit, on the theory that
such a unit should be found appropriate in order that collective bargaining for these
employees need not be delayed until a larger and possibly more appropriate unit
could be formed. May Dept. Stores Co. v. N. L. R. B., 326 U. S. 376 (1945).
Apparently dissatisfied with the Board's recognition of the doctrine under the Wagner
Act, Congress enacted that the ". . . extent to which employees have organized shall
not be controlling." 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 159 (Supp. 1947), amend-
ing National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449, 453 (1935). Although the Board
in the instant case asserted that the unit ". . . should have been found inappropriate
for bargaining purposes even before the Act was amended to limit the Board's
application" of the doctrine, this case is indicative of the trend which is evident in
Delaware Knitting Co., 75 N. L. R. B. No. 27 (Nov. 14, 1947) and Duluth Glass
Block Store Co., 76 N. L. R. B. No. 156 (April 2, 1948).
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also constitutes a departure from the Board's policy in a complaint pro-
ceeding to refuse to examine de novo a contention that the unit is not
appropriate unless evidence is submitted that was not considered in the
previous representation proceeding or unless some material change has
been made.' 0 Full justification for the retention of such a policy is evi-
dent once an examination is made of the difficulties and delays encountered
in obtaining enforcement of Board determinations." Deviation from
such a policy will render unit determinations less significant inasmuch
as an employer may refuse to bargain knowing that he may set up the
inappropriateness of the unit as a defense in a subsequent complaint pro-
ceeding. Furthermore, it may result in the Board's duplicating its own
efforts, and place a considerable burden on the complainant in a refusal
to bargain case by requiring him to be prepared to justify the unit de
novo in every instance where the issue is raised.
Although it is conceded that Congress in the changes made in the
Taft-Hartley Act 12 intended that only slight weight should be given to
the extent-of-organization principle, the wisdom of permitting an employer
to disregard a certification made prior to such Congressional mandate,
refuse to bargain, and then be exonerated by the Board on the basis of his
original defense is questionable. If the statutory purpose of stability in
bargaining relations is to be achieved, the Board must grant a degree of
permanence to its own determinations.
Labor Law-Taft-Hartley Act-Issuance of Labor Injunctions
by Federal District Courts on Petition of Private Parties-A union
threatened to picket a bus terminal which serviced several bus companies
unless the terminal discontinued servicing the busses of a company with
which the union was engaged in a labor dispute. Although members of
a different union, the terminal employees stated that they would not cross
the picket line, whereupon the terminal sought and obtained a permanent
injunction against the picketing from a federal district court, the court de-
riving its power to issue the injunction from the Taft-Hartley Act.'
Dixie Motor Coach v. Amalgamated Association, 74 F. Supp. 952 (W.
D. Ark. 1947). In another case, an employer refused to bargain with
the union upon the expiration of the collective bargaining contract. The
10. The Board has recently reiterated this policy in Plankinton Packing Co.,
75 N. L. R. B. No. 32 (Nov. 19, 1947); accord, J. L. Hudson Co., 54 N. L. R. B.
855 (1944) ; Botany Worsted Mills, 41 N. L. R. B. 218 (1942), enforcement granted,
133 F. 2d 876 (C. C. A. 3d 1943), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 751 (1943). But cf.
Potomac Electric Power Co., 73 N. L. R. B. 1291 (1947) in which the Board re-
examined the record in the representation proceeding and found that the unit pre-
viously determined appropriate improperly included certain categories of employees,
but since it was a minor modification, the Board held that it was insufficient to
require a dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge based on refusal to bargain.
See 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 34 (1947).
11. The history of the instant case is indicative of such difficulties inasmuch as
the original certification was made in October 1945 and this complaint was filed in
November 1946. Throughout this period employer refused to bargain; and even had
the Board issued an order to "cease and desist" the employer could have delayed
further since such orders are not self-enforcing and the Board would have been
required to petition the appropriate circuit court of appeals for enforcement.
12. See note 9 supra.
1. 61 STAT. 136, 29 'U. S. C. A. § 141 (Supp. 1947). Officially cited as the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947. Hereinafter cited by section only.
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union struck, and when the employer attempted to induce the employees
to return, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board.
While the complaint was still pending, the union obtained a temporary
injunction from a federal district court restraining the employer from
his unfair labor practices. This court also derived its injunctive power
from the Taft-Hartley Act. Textile Workers v. Amazon Cotton Mill,
76 F. Supp. 159 (D. N. C. 1947).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 substantially eliminated the use of the
injunction in labor disputes affecting interstate commerce.3  It is ap-
parent from the foregoing decisions that the Taft-Hartley Act, which
amends the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the extent of giving the NLRB
the power to seek injunctions, 4 may be the inspiration for judicial at-
tempts to revive the use of the labor injunction at the request of private
parties. The Act makes an inducement to strike for the purpose of
forcing employer A to cease dealing with employer B an unlawful act
for which employer A can sue for damages, 5 and an unfair labor prac-
tice0 against which the Board must seek an injunction." If picketing
is to be construed as an inducement to strike, as in the Dixie case, this
section negates previous decisions 8 which have held "secondary picket-
ing" 9 not subject to injunction.10 Since it is mandatory for the Board
to seek such an injunction,:" both the company and the court appear to
have been over-eager in the Dixie case. Indeed, the language of the
Act,' 2 the Congressional debates preceding its passage,' 3 and the defeat
of the Ball amendment which would have expressly allowed private parties
2. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 (1940).
3. GREGoRY, LABOR AND THE LAW 184-199 (1946); Witte, The Federal Anti-
Injunction Act, 16 MINN. L. REv. 638 (1932); Riddlesbarger, The Federal Anti-
Injunction Act, 14 ORE. L. REv. 242 (1935).
4. Sec. 10(j) and 10(1). Sec. 208(a) gives the Attorney-General authority to
petition for an injunction in national emergencies.
5. Sec. 303.
6. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . . to induce
the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in
the course of their employment . . . to perform any services, where an object thereof
is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer . . . to join any labor organization . . .
or to cease . . . doing business with any other person, . . ." Sec. 8(b)4.
7. Sec. 10(1) states that if the regional attorney or officer of the Board "has
reasonable cause to believe" that a secondary boycott or jurisdictional strike exists,
"he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition" for an injunction (emphasis added).
8. Bakery Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U. S.
321 (1941). But cf. Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942).
9. For analyses of the general problem of secondary boycotts, see Hellerstein,
Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YALE L. J. 341 (1938); Barnard and
Graham, Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 WAsH. L. REv. 137 (1940).
10. Prior to AFL v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941), the legality of injunctions
against picketing was determined, in part at least, by the judicial finding of a "labor
dispute" within the Norris-La Guardia Act. The Swing case, however, was decided
on the basis of the right of free speech. Consequently, if §§ 8(b)4A and 303(a) are
construed, as in the instant case, to include picketing, there is a serious doubt as to
their constitutionality. See Note, Labor's Economic Weapons and the Taft-Hartley
Act, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 85, 89 (1947).
11. Note 7 mpra.
12. "It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only" to engage in a
secondary boycott. Sec. 303(a). (emphasis added). See also note 7 supra.
13. When Senator Morse suggested that the use of the word "unlawful" in
§303(a) might be construed as restoring the right of seeking an injunction, Senator
Taft vigorously denied that such was his intent and replied, "I do not believe that
any court would [so] construe the amendment." 93 CONG. R1c. 4872 (May 9, 1947).
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to seek injunctions directly 14 make it clear that this power to seek in-
junctions against unfair labor practices has been restored for the use of
the Board only and not for the private parties.1
5
Since it is only discretionary for the Board to seek an injunction
against an employer's unfair labor practices,' the action of the union in
the Textile Workers case is perhaps more justifiable, but equally unsound.
Prior to the Wagner Act,' 7 a union could not have obtained relief from
an employer's refusal to bargain or from his interfering with the em-
ployees in the selection of their own union under the circumstances of
the instant case. The Wagner Act, in designating these as unfair labor
practices,' 8 gave the NLRB the sole power to institute proceedings to
prevent the practices or enforce the remedies. 19 While the Taft-Hartley
Act removes this exclusive jurisdiction of the Board, the change is proba-
bly to be construed to go no further than to allow damage suits by the
private parties. 20  Since the use of the injunction by labor unions has
been infrequent in the past,2 ' it would be an ironic result if the Taft-
Hartley Act were to be responsible for stimulating the use of this potent
weapon by unions.
The historic misuse of the labor injunction 22 forced the adoption of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The readiness with which courts seem to
be re-appropriating the injunctive power is disconcerting. Because of
the highly complex nature of labor problems and the peculiar qualifications
of the NLRB to solve them, the circumvention of the Board, either by
employers or unions, is unwise and unwarranted. Courts should dis-
courage this circumvention and should refrain from using the Act as a
springboard for returning to rule by injunction.
Railroads-Federal Transportation Act-Federal and Not State
Law Governs Liability of Railroad for Wrongful Death of Employee
Riding on Free Pass-Decedent was killed in a railroad collision in Utah
while riding as a passenger in a train of the respondent. Though he was
an employee of respondent, at the time of his death he was returning from
a vacation, travelling on a free pass which contained the provision that
the user assumed all risk of injury to person or property, whether by
negligence or otherwise. Suit was brought in the Federal District Court
14. 93 CONG. REc. 4847 (May 9, 1947).
15. Bakery Union v. Wagshal, 68 Sup. Ct. 630, 632 (1948) per Frankfurter, J.,
"The short answer to the argument that the . . . Act . . . has removed the limita-
tions of the Norris-La Guardia Act against what are known as secondary boycotts
is that the law has been changed only where an injunction is sought by the National
Labor Relations Board, not where the proceedings are instituted by a private party."
16. "The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint . . . to petition
any District Court . . . for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order."
Sec. 10(j).
17. 49 STAT. 449 (1935).
18. Sec. 8(1) and (5).
19. Amalgamated Utility v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U. S. 261 (1940);
Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96 F. 2d 450 (C. C. A. 7th 1938).
20. Sec. 303(b). The fact that the Board considers the injunction request while
the private parties may sue directly in the court leads to difficult problems of dual
jurisdiction. See Note, Labor's Economic Weapons and the Taft-Hartley Act, 96
U. OF PA. L. REv. 85, 97 (1947).
21. Mason, Organized Labor as Party Plaintiff in Injilction Cases, 30 COL. L.
REv. 466 (1930) ; Witte, Labor's Resort to the Injunction, 39 YALE L. J. 374 (1930).
22. FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); GREGORY,
LABOR AND THE LAW, 95-104 (1946). See also the famous opinion of judge Amidon
in Great Northern Railway v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414 (D. N. D. 1923).
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in Utah by the minor children of the deceased under the Utah death
statute, jurisdiction of the federal court being founded on diversity of
citizenship. Judgment for defendant was affirmed by the Supreme Court
(3 justices dissenting) which held that the Transportation Act and not
state law controlled, and that under the federal law the carrier is not
liable for ordinary negligence resulting in death of its employee riding
on a free pass containing provisions designed to discharge the carrier from
liability. Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 611 (1948).
Congress passed the Hepburn Act' in 1906 as an answer to wide-
spread discriminations of the railroads and, as part thereof, to put a stop
to their practice of issuing free passes as a means of influencing public
officials. Certain classes of persons, among them employees, were spe-
cifically exempted from the free pass prohibition of the Act.2  In 1940
Congress passed the Transportation Act 3 incorporating in it, without
material changes, the pass provisions of the Hepburn Act.4  In 1923 the
Supreme Court in the case of Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Van Zant 5 had
decided that an interstate carrier was not liable for injuries suffered by
an employee holding a free pass which contained the exonerating clause.6
The Court rested its decision in that case on the premise that the liability
of the carrier was a question of "federal law." The decision in the in-
stant case follows necessarily from an acceptance of this premise. It is
significant to observe, however, that there is nothing in the Hepburn Act
itself, or the Congressional hearings that preceded its passage, which makes
any reference whatever to the privilege of carriers to stipulate for limita-
tion of liability in the case of free passes issued to employees or to any
other user.3 To understand, therefore, how the court arrived at its
decision in the Van Zant case, it is necessary to go back to the rule of
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Adamss decided prior to the passage of the
Hepburn Act. There, in the case of a passenger killed white riding
free, the Supreme Court held that a railroad could successfully limit its
liability by making the appropriate provision on the pass.9 This rule was
announced at a time when the federal courts could declare "general law"
for the states.10 The decision of the Van Zant case therefore, did not
necessarily follow from the application of the Hepburn Act; it more prob-
ably followed from application of the Admis rule. Contrasted with the
federal rule the states' attitude has been hostile with respect to stipu-
1. 34 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (7) (1940).
2. Sec. 1(7) of the Hepburn Act provides: "No common carrier subject to the
provisions of this chapter shall, directly or indirectly, issue or give any interstate
free ticket, free pass, or free transportation for passengers, except to its employees
and their families, its officers, . . .
3. 54 STAT. 899, 49 U. S. C. § 1(7) (1940).
4. Sec. 1(7) of the Transportation Act simply expands the groups eligible to
ride on free passes.
5. 260 U. S. 459 (1923), reversing 289 Mo. 163, 232 S. W. 696 (1921).
6. The Court relied on Charleston and W. C. Ry. v. Thompson, 234 U. S. 576
(1914). Here the Court held that the pass on which the injured wife of the emproyee
had ridden "was free under the statute." Then it went on and upheld the pass
stipulations for railroad exemption from liability for negligence. Cf. Norfolk Southern
R. R. v. Chatman, 244 U. S. 276 (1917); Grand Trunk Ry. v. Stevens, 95 U. S.
655 (1877).
7. See 40 CONG. REc. 7741, 7851-7852, 7920-7940, 7978-7998 (1906).
8. 192 U. S. 440 (1904).
9. See to the same effect Boering v. Chesapeake Beach Ry,, 193 U. S. 442 (1904).
10. Under the rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U. S. 1 (1842) the federal courts
exercising jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship were free, in matters
of general jurisprudence, to exercise an independent judgment as to what the common
law of the State was, or should be.
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lations by carriers against liability for negligence in the case of free
passes "l and petitioners might well have recovered under Utah law.
12
Therefore, had the question of a carrier's liability to the user of a free
pass arisen after Erie R. R. v. Tompkins= 3 was decided, without the
pronouncement of the Adams case, it is safe to say that the rule of the
Van Zant case would not have followed by a mere application and con-
struction of the Act.
Even if we accept the carrier's liability as a question to be decided
by "federal law," whether the result is necessary or desirable, and whether
Congress ever intended to perpetuate it can best be approached from an
analysis of the "free pass" concept. The granting of such passes may
well be a provision of the work contract between railroads and their em-
ployees, or it may be the practice of railroads to allow free passes as an
incentive to their employees. The Congressional hearings reveal that em-
ployees were excluded from the provision of the Act prohibiting the is-
suance of free passes because they were thought to be entitled to them.'
4
Therefore, a contrary result might have been reached in these cases by a
recognition that such passes are not really "free" inasmuch as they are
part of the employee's compensation. In this light it would have been
desirable to reverse the archaic Adams rule and adopt one more in accord
with the social philosophy of other current legislation.' 5
Trade Regulation-Pricing to Meet Competition as Defense
under the Robinson-Patman Act-Charged by the Federal Trade
Commission with selling automatic controls for heating plants at discrimi-
natory prices in violation of § 2 (a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act,' respondent was unable to show that the discounts
11. See Clark v. Southern Ry., 69 Ind. App. 697, 199 N. E. 539 (1918); St.
Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Pitcock, 82 Ark. 441, 101 S. W. 725 (1907); Galveston, H.
& S. A. Ry. v. Bean, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 52, 99 S. W. 721 (1907); Norfolk & W.
Ry. v. Tanner, 100 Va. 379, 41 S. E. 721 (1902). All the states today have wrongful
death statutes. See TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL AcT § 19 et seq. (2d ed. 1913) ;
Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 MICH. L.
Rav. 114 (1924). There is no federal death statute because no need was ever felt
for one, since state legislation met the problem adequately.
12. UTAH CODE ANN. § 104-3-11 (1943). See Hansen v. Oregon Short Line
R. R., 55 Utah 577, 188 Pac. 852 (1920); Williams v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 18
Utah 210, 54 Pac. 991 (1898).
13. 304 U. S. 64 (1938). Here the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson was repudiated,
the Court declaring (p. 78), "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state."
14. See 40 CONG. Rac. 7852 (1906).
15. Compensation acts, Employers' Liability acts, and other social insurance
legislation all reflect the public concern over the status of the accidentally injured.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 34 STAT. 232 (1906), 45 U. S. C. § 55 (1940)
provides "Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent
of which shall be to enable any common law carrier to exempt itself from any
liability . . . shall to that extent be void . . ."
1. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a)
(1940). "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to dis-
criminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them:
Provided, That nothing . . . shall prevent differentials which make only due allow-
ance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers
sold or delivered .. "
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which it accorded large-volume purchasers were justified by savings in
cost resulting from quantity sales. Respondent, long a dominant figure
in the heat control industry, showed however that all of its prices were
higher than those of competitors to whom it had steadily been losing
business. Ordered, one Commissioner dissenting, that respondent cease
and desist from selling controls at different prices to competing oil burner
manufacturers when the differences in price are not justified by savings
in distribution costs resulting from volume sales; such practice tends sub-
stantially to injure competition among respondent's customers and be-
tween respondent and its competitors. Respondent's asserted defense
under § 2(b) of the Act 2 is rejected on the basis of a finding that in
several instances the price differentials bore no relation to the meeting of
competition and a holding that, even if they did, § 2(b) could not be con-
strued to sanction a discriminatory pricing systen. 3 Minneapolis-Honey-
well Regulator Co., Dkt. No. 4920, FTC, Jan. 14, 1948.4
Although the Commission's treatment of the issue raised by the § 2(b)
defense involves a measure of circuitous reasoning,5 it is apparent that
it is relying on a reading of FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co.6 as a declara-
tion that pricing systems are ipso facto not to be considered as having
been established in "good faith" within the meaning of that section.7
This position has been substantiated by the subsequent Supreme Court de-
cision in FTC v. Cement Institute.8 However, the desirability of foster-
ing the use of pricing as a competitive device 9 dictates careful considera-
tion of the consequences of imposing a rule which may seriously deter its
use. This factor may suggest that a distinction be drawn between sys-
tematic discriminations practiced by a group of sellers all of whom are
charged with violations of the Act,'0 and a system employed by a single
2. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amehded, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(b)
(1940). "Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section,
that there has been discrimination in price . . ., the burden of rebutting the prima
facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged
with a violation of this section . , . : Provided, however, That nothing . . . shall
prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing that his
lower price . . . was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor. .. ."
3. By considering evidence under §2(b) in the instant case after a finding
that injury to competition had been affirmatively shown, the Commission is ap-
parently receding from its position that this defense is available only to rebut a
prima facie case made by showing a price difference and is not a substantive jus-
tification in those cases where the Commission assumes and sustains the burden
of showing injury to competition. Standard Oil Co. of Ind., 3 CCH TRADE REG.
SERV. (9th ed.) 113,295 (FTC 1945), order miodified, 3 id. ff 13,447 (FTC 1946),
review pend'g, 3 id. 13,492. For a full discussion of this question, see Austern,
Required Competitive Injury and Permitted Meeting of Competition, N. Y. BAR
Ass'N, ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SYmposIum 63, 70-77 (1947).
4. Reported in 3 CCH TRADE REG. SERV. (9th ed.) 13,675 (FTC 1948).
5. [Findings, pp. 14-16; Opinion, pp. 5-6.]
6. 324 U. S. 746 (1945).
7. Id. at 753. But see the Court's further discussion, id. at 754-755.
8. 16 U. S. L. WEEK 4359 (U. S. April 27, 1948).
9. For a discussion of pricing, as compared with other competitive devices, see
NELSON AND KEImA, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BusINEss POLICY 101-108 (TNEC Mono-
graph 1, 1941).
10. The Staley case involved the use of a single basing point system, and the
companion case of Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726 (1945),
affirmed an order directed at the use of the same system by Staley's competitor; the
Cement Institute case involved the use of a multiple basing point system by a large
number of producers, all of whom were joined as respondents.
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respondent. Even if a respondent's competitors are in fact using similar
policies," a cease and desist order places the respondent at a serious dis-
advantage when competitors are not similarly restricted. If this distinc-
tion is accepted, the result in the instant case cannot be justified unless
the "good faith" qualification of § 2(b) is interpreted as requiring that
the tribunal probe into the corporate mind of the respondent to determine
whether its prices were motivated by an honest effort to compete rather
than to monopolize; 12 a finding of intent to monopolize might be sup-
ported in the instant case on the ground that respondent was charged
with other practices, 13 the aggregate effect of which indicated an overly
aggressive sales policy. 14
Viewed in the light of a national policy committed to the stimulation
of competitive enterprise, the Robinson-Patman Act presents the formid-
able task of balancing the conflict between fostering competition between
a seller and his competitors on the one hand, and preserving competitive
opportunities to the seller's customers on the other hand. As a conse-
quence, constructive administration of the Act requires that the zeal to
prosecute for a violation be tempered by a recognition of this conflict and
a careful appraisal of the deterrent effect on first line competition of a
cease and desist order, not only as applicable to an individual respondent,
but also as a precedent which must guide the conduct of businessmen.
In view of the disposition of the courts to place strong reliance on ad-
ministrative interpretations in this field, 15 the responsibility of the Federal
Trade Commission becomes a heavy one.
Unemployment Compensation-Voluntarily Leaving Employ-
ment in the Face of Lay-off to Form Own Business Is Without Good
Cause-Claimant, fearing discharge because of advanced age, quit his
job for the purpose of forming his own business, which failed in three
months due to material shortages. He was subsequently declared eligible
for benefits pursuant to the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation
Law,' - on the grounds that his employment terminated when his business
failed. After exhausting his administrative remedies, the employer ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's affirmation of
the Unemployment Compensation Bureau, holding: (1) The claimant lost
his status as an employee when entering his own business, and upon its
failure became an unemployed business man, ineligible for benefits. (2)
He is disqualified under § 402 of the Act, which bars benefits for unem-
11. It is indicated that competitors of respondent in the instant case were
following the same practices. [Dissenting Opinion, p. 4.]
12. See McCollester, Section 2(b), N. Y. BAR Ass'N, ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT
Symposium 23, 30 (1946).
13. It was found that some customers had been granted "off-scale" prices, i. e.,
prices for a bracket to which the volume of their actual purchases did not entitle
them, and that respondent had entered into sales contracts which contained tying
clauses and which limited the extent to which the purchaser could buy controls
from respondent's competitors.
14. In any case a respondent must show that he was acting defensively in order
to avail himself of the § 2(b) proviso. See ZoRN AND FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE
NEW PRICE LAWS 129 (1937).
15. See, e. g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 16 U. S. L. WEEK 4359 (U. S. April 27,
1948).
1. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, c. 14 (Purdon, Supp. 1946).
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ployment ". . . due to voluntarily leaving work without good cause." 2
Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board
of Review, 56 A. 2d 254 (1948).
The Superior Court opinion was in large measure devoted to an
ingenious but unproductive bending of the statute to establish that claim-
ant remained an employee while engaged in his own business.3  The
Supreme Court likewise concentrated on this argument in disposing of
the case, but properly rejected it. The crux of the case, however, is the
interpretation of "good cause." This is the second decision of the court
of last resort on this question,4 but the Superior Court has delivered
several seemingly inconsistent opinions apparently because of slight factual
variations.5 Although the statutory wording on this point bears a marked
similarity in most states," decisions of the courts are far from uniform.
7
The only case involving quitting one job to take another held against the
claimant, but the pertinent statute required ". . . good cause attributable
to the employer." 8 Administrative adjudications are more numerous and
uniform. The vast majority hold that where the quitting employee is
reasonably certain of other adequate employment, whether a new job or
business of his own, he has left work with "good cause." 9
The Pennsylvania court, in the instant case has rejected the "general
welfare" approach, which tests the claimant by his attachment to the
labor market and sincere desire and readiness to work, and has chosen
a course bordering on the restrictive "employer fault" theory. This
theory judges the employee by his readiness to continue in his last job,
and searches for some fault on the part of the employer. 10 In so doing the
2. "An employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week-(b) In
which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without good cause."
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 802 (Purdon, Supp. 1946).
3. Dawkins Unemployment Compensation Case, 160 Pa. Super. 501, 504, 52 A.
2d 362, 363 (1947).
4. Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 356
Pa. 43, 50 A. 2d 336 (1947), 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 686. (This case, however in-
volved "good cause" for refusing new employment, § 802(a) of the Act.)
5. In re Dames Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super. 564, 45 A.
2d 909 (1946) (woman who left her employment to marry left voluntarily without
good cause) ; I. re Sturdevant Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super.
548, 45 A. 2d 898 (1946) (woman who left her employment to join her husband left
work voluntarily with good cause).
6. As of the close of 1943, 32 states had unlimited "good cause" provisions.
Ten others restricted it to "good cause attributable to the employer," and six to
"causes connected with the individual's work." Kempher, Disqualification for Vol-
untary Leaving and Misconduct, 55 YA.LE L. J. 147, 150 n. 5 (1945).
7. Sickness: Compare Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Board of Review, 70 Ohio
App. 370, 45 N. E. 2d 152 (1942) (woman who quit draughty employment because
susceptible to colds, not available for work), with Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp.,
219 Minn. 306, 18 N. W. 2d 249 (1945) (Quitting because of an allergy to the ma-
terial worked with is involuntary and with good cause attributable to the employer).
Change of residence: Compare Woodmen of World Life Insurance Society v.
Olsen, 141 Neb. 776, 4 N. W. 2d 923 (1942) (woman leaving employment for the
sole purpose of being with husband is not good cause), with it re Teicher Unem-
ployment Compensation Case, 154 Pa. Super. 250, 35 A. 2d 739 (1943) (woman
leaving employment to be with husband is good cause).
8. Iowa Public Service Co. v. Rhode, 230 Iowa 751, 298 N. W. 794 (1941).
9. 2317-Idaho A. Ben. Ser. Vol. 2 No. 12 (1939); 1505-Ind. A. Ben. Ser.
Vol. 2 No. 5 (1938) ; 5822-Nebr. R. Ben. Ser. Vol. 4 No. 5 (1940) ; 10928--S. Dak.
A. Ben. Ser. Vol. 9 No. 10 (1946); 2212-Tenn. A. Ben. Ser. Vol. 2 No. 11 (1939).
Contra: 3988-Ga. R. Ben. Ser. Vol. 3 No. 7 (1940).
10. Simrell, Employer Fault v. General Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment
Compensation, 55 YALE L. J. 181 (1945).
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court was palpably influenced by the determination of "experience rating," 11
whereby the tax rates of the employer vary with the percentage of his
employees compensated in relation to the state percentage, and the fear
of "compensated rest." It is submitted that these considerations should
carry little weight here. The courts with unanimity proclaim that the
compensation statutes are to be construed liberally 1 2 and that the allevia-
tion of the unemployed workers' distress should not be prejudiced by the
secondary consideration of experience rating.'3  The "vacation" problem
will be present in any compensation case. The tendency here may be to
influence the employee to stick to his job, permitting change to better em-
ployment only at the risk of disqualification for benefits. It seems unfor-
tunate that the court has chosen to restrict unnecessarily the liberal words
of the statute,14 particularly in view of Pennsylvania's harsh disqualifi-
cation procedure.' 5 The purpose of benefits in normal periods, alleviation
of distress and the bolstering of purchasing power 16 are not served, and
are indeed frustrated by such narrow reading of "good cause." The test
adhered to by the administrative bodies is more consonant with the ob-
jectives of compensation. In the light of the varied and difficult fact
situations which preclude an inflexible approach, the most desirable solu-
tion seems to be a recognition of the experience of the administrator, mak-
ing the decision of the Bureau final, if it has warrant on the record and a
reasonable basis in law. 17
11. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 781 (Purdon, Supp. 1946).
12. Rochester Dairy Co. v. Christgau, 217 Minn. 460, 14 N. W. 2d 780 (1944);
MacFarland v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 418,
45 A. 2d 423 (1946).
13. In re Sturdevant Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super. 548,
562, 45 A. 2d 898, 906 (1946).
14. The statute originally disqualified for "... voluntarily leaving work." PA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 802(b) (Purdon, 1941).
15. Most states provide for disqualification for a certain number of weeks, but
Pennsylvania is one of the few states which totally disqualifies the employee for
voluntarily leaving work without good cause. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 802 (Purdon,
Supp. 1946).
16. Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE
L. J. 1, 12 (1945) ; Clayne, The Economics of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE
L. 3. 53, 68 (1945).
17. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944).
